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The Loneliness of the Long-Distance 
Cyclist: Cyclic Form in Frazer and Proust 
ROBERT FRASER 
Royal Holloway, London 
The digressive structure of some late nineteenth-century and early 
twentieth-century multi-volume works makes demands upon the reader 
arguably unique in kind. The magnum opus, whose perusal requires not hours 
or days, but weeks if not months, forces upon us a concentration and 
flexibility of response akin to few other kinds of literary effort. It is like a solo 
bicycle ride to eternity since the destination proposed is forever dissolving, 
like the horizon itself. For such writers of fiction as Proust, as much as for 
discursive analysts such as SirJames Frazer, that destination is truth as the 
object of desire; it is essential to the whole conception that desire should 
constantly be sustained. For that reason, the structure of such works often 
corresponds to a kind of cyclic form in which alternatives are played out and 
then replayed. The cyclist proposes to himselfa corner to be turned, yet once 
there the vista stretches out once more, equally tantalizing, equally compel- 
ling. For many such texts indeed, the last prospect is as evasive as the first, 
and the fulfilment or closure, if it is possible to speak of such a thing, depends 
upon a recognition that the termination of all readerly possibilities is in effect 
a vanishing point. 
For Proust, texts are like jealousy. The compulsion to read, to assimilate, 
and to know resembles nothing so much as that inveterate desire to devour 
the being of another which leads the impassioned narrator of La Prisonniere 
and Albertine disparue first to entrap the beloved, then, once she has of 
necessity broken free, to pursue her across river and plain, to Venice and 
beyond even to the gates of death; finally to let her float, reassembled, into 
the contingency of art where she melts conclusively with his perceptions of 
her. For the beloved herself, needless to say, this process means nothing. 
Regarding him and his efforts with the supreme aloofness of one made 
inviolable through indifference, she goes on her way regardless, teasing him 
with intimations of intimacy, then escaping into the perverse freedom of her 
Sapphism, a place where she can mock him and then disappear, withholding 
in her last moments even the secret of her death. Maddening, the author is 
left with nothing, forced to reconstruct her endlessly from his memories of 
her, or rather to mould her in the absolute vacancy that she has become. 
A la recherche du temps perdu behaves like this, for author and for reader alike. 
There is, for example, the sheer committed process of reading, a task made 
more complex since 1989 by the appearance of the apparently definitive, 
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four-volume Pleiade edition with its seemingly infinite series of ancillary 
drafts.' The question that immediately arises in the mind of the reader is 
this: where exactly do the drafts end, and the text begin? One is used to 
variorum editions, but in a variorum edition of a Shakespeare play it is 
normally possible to identify a posited general line from which the variations 
listed are departures, or at least conceded alternatives. Shakespearean 
scholars may well find this statement naive, but the fact remains that in 
Proust the edge is so blurred that one wonders frequently precisely what text 
it is that one is reading. One has rather an infinite series of re-runs, each one 
slightly different from the last, and each apparently of equal value. From 
these revolutions of the fictive wheel, one must simply make one's choice. 
Nor is this all. Within the various drafts, within each reconstruction of the 
tale, there are alternatives of interpretation as every episode, every flicker of 
subjective response (for what else is the adventure of A la recherche du temps 
perdu but a journey into such subjectivity?) is subjected to a bewildering 
array of multiple perspectives. No sooner is the cycle of one such perspective 
complete, than another turn of the wheel throws all into question. There is 
an episode in La Prisonniere which perfectly illustrates this process. Albertine, 
who is being kept under lock and key in the narrator's flat, proposes to attend 
a reception being given by Madame Verdurin, a social opportunity which he 
is anxious to forestall since it will give her access to precisely the Gomorrhan 
contacts he has determined to prevent. Instead he suggests that she pay a 
visit to the Trocadero in the presence of her friend Andree, who at this point 
in the proceedings he is prepared to regard as the perfect chaperone. But a 
chance reading in that day's Figaro of a notice announcing the appearance 
that evening at the Trocadero theatre of the actress Lea, whose Lesbian 
proclivities are well known, throws his calculation into disarray; he 
promptly dispatches the servant Fran?oise to the theatre to fetch Albertine 
back, thus disturbing the very scenario he has so carefully set up (III, 
652-57). 
At one point, while he waits, he sits down at the piano and strums the 
sonata by Vinteuil, one motif of which has become associated in both the 
reader's mind and his own with Swann's earlier, equally obsessive guard- 
ianship of Odette de Crecy. The theme of this guardianship, and hence of the 
sonata, is from one point of view physical passion; from another the sort of 
restrictivejealousy that hollows such passion out. The form of the sonata is a 
species of late Romantic variation technique, a technique which at such 
moments the narrator seems determined to echo. 
We can go further. The Vinteuil sonata has many antecedents, but the 
most credible is the violin sonata in D by Cesar Franck, whose own style of 
variation on a theme is directly derived from the 'cyclic form' that the 
Belgian composer had studied in Beethoven. And, as the narrator plays, he 
1 A la recherche du temps perdu, ed. byJean-Yves Tadi6, 4 vols (Paris: Gallimard, 1987). All references are 
to this edition. 
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thinks of the parity between the music he is playing and that of the supreme 
cycle in musical literature: Wagner's Ring, the leitmotiftechnique of which 
also has much in common with Beethoven and hence with Vinteuil or 
Franck. At this juncture Proust's technique is cyclic too, since the narrator is 
turning over in his mind the diaphanous and ever shifting textures of his 
jealousy (iv, 177-82). Like a turning vase, or perhaps the spinning axle of a 
wheel, his possessive obsession with his mistress fluctuates endlessly as 
viewed in the variegated light. Nor does the wheel stop turning when the 
cycle is apparently complete: even when the episode of Albertine's expedi- 
tion is brought to an apparently satisfactory conclusion by her return, 
retrospect will throw it once more into confusion when the narrator subse- 
quently discovers that Andree, the seemingly perfect chaperone, should in 
reality have been the primary source of his jealousy (Iv, I77-82). The 
discovery subjects the whole of Albertine's history to another recital of 
endlessly reassembled re-interpretation. The whole of Albertine disparue, 
subsequent to her disappearance and death, consists of nothing but a set of 
variations on the theme of jealousy of the dead, all the more insistent in that 
the physical being that provoked it has now dissolved. 
It is not simply the being and nature of the beloved that prove elusive: the 
text, too, constantly threatens to evaporate. The successive editions of 
Proust's book, the compiling of which represents an activity which itself 
corresponds to a kind of scholarly improvisation, has alerted us to the extent 
to which for Proust all writing is a kind of variation around an original whose 
essence lies in its refusal to settle down. The cause and circumstances of 
Albertine's decease, for example, depend crucially upon a reading of mar- 
ginalia to the typescript: they cannot be laid to rest any more than can the 
narrator's doubts.2 
And what kind of rest does the narrator/writer in any case desire? Will the 
irrefutable fact either of Albertine's infidelity or of her loyalty satisfy him? 
The answer is that both might, and also that neither will. At one point in the 
Trocadero episode already alluded to, Proust encapsulates that uncertainty 
in a sentence. He is dwelling on the circumstances that might render 
infidelity permissible (small hope: he has just been dilating with equal 
fervour on the absolute imperative of indifference). Some men, he opines, are 
content to allow the beloved her erotic freedom provided it is exercised in a 
space that is under their absolute control: their own house or, in the 
narrator's case, apartment. Others may countenance such liberty provided 
it is realized in a country of which they are ignorant: in circumstances that 
they cannot even visualize and which therefore cause them no disquiet. Thus 
the assuaging of his pain may theoretically be met by two conditions 
opposite and equally extreme, both by knowing and by not knowing: 
2 Recherche, IV, 58, and 'Notes et variantes', p. Io62. 
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J'avais a l'egard d'Albertine ces deux sortes de manie calmante. Je n'aurais pas ete 
jaloux si elle avait eu des plaisirs pres de moi, encourages par moi, quej'aurais tenus 
tout entiers sous ma surveillance, m'epargnant par la la crainte du mensonge;je ne 
l'aurais peut-etre pas ete non plus si elle etait partie dans un pays assez inconnu de 
moi et eloigne pour queje ne puisse imaginer, ni avoir la possibilite et la tentation de 
connaitre son genre de vie. Dans les deux cas le doute eut ete supprime par une 
connaissance ou une ignorance egalement completes. (III, 539-40)3 
But these pre-conditions for the alleviation of his suffering correspond 
exactly to the two situations which, as the text amply demonstrates, most 
assuredly provoke it. To the author's peace of mind, a tranquillity which 
never occurs since it would bring his subjective journeying to a point of 
repose, closure, and openness are equally detrimental and, in practice, 
equally shunned. 
In his spinning of this affective wheel, the narrator has one companion: the 
reader who is obliged to re-construe the tale even as it is told. The continual 
positing and dismantling of successive observations is itself a process into 
which the reader is willingly drawn since the momentum of the novel (at 
many moments hardly rich in incident) depends crucially upon just such 
excited collusion. The fabric of the narrator's mind is something that is 
constantly read and read again (such is the meaning of memory), re- 
constructed as the reader, having agreed to certain provisional conclusions, 
is forced to reconsider them and think anew. The provisional processes of 
reading thus induced remind one of the ways in which a critic such as Stanley 
Fish describes the reading of a Milton sonnet, with the important difference 
that these are effects and ambiguities which are traced out over many pages 
and, in some cases, volumes. The whole demeanour of La Prisonniere, for 
example, its gestures towards emotional independence, are thrown into 
doubt by Albertine disparue, that extended palinode. A second reading of the 
earlier volume benefits from such reconstruction, in much the same way as in 
Sodome et Gomorrhe i the homoerotic dalliance of M. de Charlus and Jupien,4 
initially misread by the narrator's (assumedly heterosexual) eyes, gains in 
depth but also transparency after the prolonged dissertation on the homo- 
sexual condition represented by Sodome et Gomorrhe 2. For this purpose, in 
Sodome et Gomorrhe i Proust employs the analogy of biological signalling, 
signalling whose semantics are constantly worked and re-worked in the 
successive verbalizations to which they are prone. This is a procedure 
intrinsic to the whole of A la recherche, in which the minute syntax of body 
3 
'With respect to Albertine I harboured these two kinds of consoling mania. I would not have been 
jealous had she experienced pleasures close to me that I would have had entirely under my surveillance, 
assuaging fear by this means; nor would I perhaps have been so had she departed into a country more or 
less unknown to me and so far removed that I could not imagine it nor possess the possibility of being 
acquainted with her style of life. In the two cases my doubt would have been suppressed by a knowledge 
or an ignorance equally complete.' 
4 III, 3-33. 
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language (Gilberte's opening gambit behind the hawthorn bush at Tan- 
sonville, for example)5 is constantly taken up into the text and revised 
through progressive verbalization. The process is unending; even in the 
culminating phase of Le Temps retrouve the narrator and reader alike are 
forever being wrongfooted by something as simple as the jingling of ice in a 
glass; the slippage of uneven paving stones. The recherche is an endless process 
of research, research however on a subject whose proposed agenda is forever 
disappearing beyond view. 
Proust's method is thus a kind of indeterminacy principle: the observer 
changes the observed. The progressive revisions of Proust's text are like 
memory itself, concentrated upon an object that will not, and must not, stay 
still. To freeze the text would be to freeze the object, something that one 
cannot do without raising the theoretical question of what it is in which the 
object consists, a question which neither Proust nor his narrator (who, for 
this purpose alone, behave identically) wishes to settle. 
The indeterminacy of the researched subject is a phenomenon seemingly 
intrinsic to the fin-de-siecle, or of literary projects conceived within it. Sir 
James Frazer's The Golden Bough appeared in four editions in his lifetime.6 All 
four versions of this epic investigation into the roots of myth and ritual begin 
in a mood of apparently sanguine confidence that the truth is something that 
can be reached provided the inductive net is thrown sufficiently wide. The 
cult of Diana at Nemi is a mystery which rigorous research (ai la recherche du 
temps perdu?) can avowedly clear up: 
Accordingly if we can show that a barbarous custom, like that of the priesthood of 
Nemi, has existed elsewhere; if we can detect the motives that led to its institution; if 
we can prove that these motives operated widely, perhaps universally, in human 
society, producing in varied circumstances a variety of institutions specifically 
different but generically alike; if we can show, lastly, that the very motives, with 
some of their derivative institutions, were actually at work in classical antiquity; 
then we may fairly infer that at a remoter age the same motives gave birth to the 
priesthood at Nemi. Such an inference, in default of direct evidence as to how 
the priesthood did actually arise, can never amount to demonstration. But it will be 
more or less probable according to the degree of completeness with which it fulfils 
the conditions that I have indicated. The object of this book is, by meeting these 
conditions, to offer a fairly probable explanation of the priesthood of Nemi. (i, o) 
'Such an inference [...] can never amount to a demonstration'; in fact the 
pile-up of conditional clauses in this sentence betrays a two-fold epistemolo- 
gical insecurity, outer and inner. The outer insecurity is patently implicit in 
the comparative method of anthropological investigation: in the widening of 
prospects, the wilderness of instances, the centre eventually and inevitably 
gives. It is thus that in the preface to the final part of the Third Edition 
5 Contrast the initial description of this gesture at Recherche I, 139, and the narrator's response to it, with 
Gilberte's subsequent explanation of it at Iv, 558-60. 6 First Edition: 1890; Second: I9oo; Third: 1906-15; Abridged Edition: I922. All references are to The 
Golden Bough, 3rd edn, I2vols (London: Macmillan, I906-I5). It is to be understood that volume 
numbers, given here, and numbers of parts, into seven of which the Third Edition is divided, are distinct. 
12 
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Frazer quite candidly concedes that this is so, and in a memorably disin- 
genuous disclosure, concedes that the subject of his dissertation is not in fact 
its subject.7 The second instability is more cogent since it is essential both to 
the conception of the book and to its origins. The object of the exercise, it will 
be remembered, is to explain how early peoples attenuate the sacred 
life-force of kings on which the well-being of the community crucially 
depends. The means by which this purpose is achieved, however, are odd in 
the extreme, to the considered as much as to the casual glance: the kings are 
granted life by the expedient of slaying them. It is a paradoxical practice and 
a paradoxical insight worthy of Frazer's contemporary Oscar Wilde ('for 
each man kills the thing he loves'). It also introduces into the argument a 
lethal insecurity since most rituals, and most myths, come under its aegis to 
be construed in two different ways: as devices of elimination and as devices of 
nurturing. If the twin poles of the Proustean universe are jealousy and 
indifference, the twin poles of the Frazerian are reverence and abhorrence. 
This two-way reading of events and customs is what Frazer calls a taboo, the 
subject of the article from which the book first emerged and the subject of the 
second part of the great Third Edition, and it permeates every phase of the 
recital. Listen to Frazer on the not unProustean theme of sexual abstinence. 
Early peoples, he says, refrain from sexual intercourse for the very same 
reason that they indulge in it: namely to fructify the earth. This may appear a 
contradiction, but it is consonant with natural reason: 
If we ask why it is that similar beliefs should logically lead, among different peoples, 
to such opposite modes of conduct as strict chastity and more or less open 
debauchery, the reason, as it presents itself to the primitive mind, is perhaps not very 
far to seek. If rude man identifies himself, in a manner, with nature; if he fails to 
distinguish the impulses and processes in himself from methods which nature adopts 
to ensure the multiplication of plants and animals, he may leap to one or two 
conclusions. Either he may infer that by yielding to his appetites he will thereby 
assist in the multiplication of plants and animals; or he may imagine that the vigour 
which he refuses to expend in reproducing his kind, will form as if were a store of 
energy whereby other creatures, whether vegetable or animal, will somehow benefit 
in propagating their species. Thus from the same crude philosophy, the same 
primitive notions of nature and life, the savage may derive by different channels a 
rule either of profligacy or of asceticism. (II, 117) 
All sacred beings, as well as sacred purposes, are subject to the same double 
bind. Adonis, we learn in the fourth part, is annually mourned in Phoenicia 
and in Cyprus in the form of a vegetation god. But since totemic animals may 
be corn spirits, Adonis is also revered under the aspect of a pig: it is thus that, 
in the fifth part, we are instructed that peoples habituated to Adonis-worship 
will not eat swine. This prohibition, intended to preserve the life of the sacred 
one, however, takes the seemingly perverse form of regarding the revered 
animal as unclean. It is thus, for Frazer, that Semitic peoples have come 
7 Frazer finally concedes that the Priest of Nemi, the 'nominal subject' of his dissertation, is 'merely a 
puppet' (x, vi). 
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unwittingly to look with loathing on what they once tended with love. The 
same contorted logic attends the slaying of all sacred animals, including the 
bear. A famous passage concerning the Ainu bear sacrifice inJapan comes to 
the perverse conclusion: 
Thus the primitive worship of animals assumes two forms, which are in some 
respects the converse of one another. On the one hand, animals are worshipped, and 
are therefore neither killed nor eaten. On the other hand, animals are worshipped 
because they are habitually killed and eaten. In both forms of worship the animal is 
revered on account of some benefit, positive or negative, which the savage hopes to 
receive from it. In the former worship the benefit comes either in the positive form of 
protection, advice, and help which the animal affords to man, or in the negative one 
of abstinence from the injuries which it is in the power of the animal to inflict. In the 
latter worship the benefit takes the form of the animal's flesh and skin. The two 
forms of worship are in some measure antithetical: in the one, the animal is not eaten 
because it is revered; in the other, it is revered because it is eaten. (vIII, 311) 
Thus Frazer's celebrants and worshippers hold, like Proust's narrator, two 
attitudes equally extreme yet basically opposed. Like Albertine, the sacred 
being, animal or human, is both adored and abhorred. For either reason, or 
for both, they kill it, just as Proust's narrator also kills off fictively the object 
of his affections in order, ineffectively, to resolve the conflicting feelings he 
cherishes towards her. Furthermore, as in Proust, the underlying instability 
of Frazer's logic threatens to topple the structure. So extreme are the 
divergences between the three full-scale editions of The Golden Bough that it is 
difficult to speak of them as the same book. 
A touch of autobiography may not be out of place here. In I991 I was 
invited by Oxford University Press to prepare for the general reader a 
portable edition of The Golden Bough.8 The invitation was made in all 
innocence: it was simply assumed by the Press that such a thing as a 
definitive Golden Bough existed which could reasonably be prepared in this 
way. Was not the so-called Abridged Edition of 1922 just such a text? But I 
had already devoted three years to the study ofFrazer's work, and knew that 
when one spoke of the various editions of his masterpiece one was not 
speaking in the same register as when one referred to, say, different editions 
of Dickens or of Hardy. The three full-scale editions, those of 1890, 1900, and 
I906-15, were in effect three different books. Should I ignore this fact and 
continue regardless, assuming that somehow in 1922 Frazer had drawn a 
line beneath the column of his additions and transformations, with a 
totalizing and totally accessible solution at the end? I had spent very little 
time on the generally accessible abridged version, but knew enough about it 
already to recognize the fact that it was in effect a different beast altogether, a 
shaggy monster smuggled in under the polite pretence of consensus and 
normalization. Misgiving turned to alarm when, looking up the correspon- 
dence for that year, I discovered that this hybrid had been concocted hastily 
8 James George Frazer, The Golden Bough: A New Abridgement from the Second and Third Editions, ed. by 
Robert Fraser (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994). 
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in three weeks by Lady Frazer with the active connivance of her husband. Its 
chapter numberings, its shape, its balance of proposition and retrenchment 
were a matter of improvisation and of compromise. In preparing the work for 
a new generation of readers, what exactly was it that I was supposed to edit? 
For, if in Proust the axle of the fictive wheel is forever turning, the same 
occurs in Frazer with the crucial difference that the radius and circumfer- 
ence are forever enlarging. Nor is this enlargement simply a matter, as it 
might at first seem, of the mere accumulation of evidence. It is not simply 
that Frazer is amplifying his argument, though he has a temperamental 
tendency to do so; it is also that the contradictory nature of the case compels 
him to write it out again and again, as if the writing will somehow absolve him 
of the absurdity of his point. The absurdity is innate in the primitive logic he 
is attempting, over and over again, both to construe, and historically to 
justify. Yet the fact is that he is drawn to it, it delimits his theme, constantly 
drawn back as he is, like a dog to an already dry bone, as is Marcel to the 
pickings of his feelings for Albertine. Thus forms of evidence are played and 
replayed: the exclusion of horses from the Arician shrine; the slaying of the 
king's son, and worked or reworked as the context and pressure of the 
argument dictate. Thus two different and sometimes mutually incompatible 
explanations of the same phenomenon are laid side by side: three different 
theories of totemism; three different theories of midsummer fires. The 
juxtaposition in the third edition is itself the product of the book's long 
gestation, since Frazer had often long ago lost faith in his earlier theories. 
Instead of eliminating what he has since come to feel is false, however, he 
recites each like a mantra and lays it dexterously in its place so that we may 
come across it in turn; that cycle of the argument meticulously though 
sometimes irrelevantly in place. In the thicket of his reasoning Frazer, like 
Proust, plays peek-a-boo with the reader: first hiding his anti-Christian 
agenda, then disclosing it, then disguising it once more. A controversial 
passage concerning the crucifixion of Christ appears, then is partially 
withdrawn, then, in the Abridged Edition of 1992 disappears altogether,9 
less for reasons of space than because Christianity, for the conventional 
western reader, is the ultimate taboo subject, focus of reverence or of 
abhorrence. In the presence of a topic so charged, Frazer can no more resolve 
his reactions than we can: it is thus that the Holy of Holies appears fleetingly 
then disappears forever behind a curtain discreetly held, or like the iconosta- 
sis in Greek churches. 
Frazer and Proust flirt with violation. Both are drawn to the forbidden, yet 
both shun it. The Barthian striptease that each enacts takes the form of 
endless extension, since-the response to contradiction for each is to expand 
and to dilate. Both Frazer and Proust replay things. For Frazer there was the 
9 The famous eliminated passage occurs originally in the Second Edition, 3 vols (London: Macmillan, 
900), in, i86-98. In the Third Edition it is relegated to an appendix (ix, 412-23). In the Oxford World's Classics edition I have replaced it (pp. 666-79). 
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progression through the Age of Magic to the Age of Religion to the Age of 
Science.10 For Proust, according to his letter to Jacques Copeau of I913, 
there was a progression through an Age of Names, to an Age of Thoughts, 
and then an Age of Things (a thin residue of this programme is left in the 
sectional titles: 'Nom de Pays: le Nom'; 'Nom de Pays: le Pays').1' Both men 
spin these schemes because they are interested in the processes- of mystifi- 
cation and de-mystification, on the individual and on the cultural plane. The 
result is that they rehearse experiences: firstly as concepts, then as patterns 
of language, then as themselves. Gilberte is experienced as all three: the 
resort Balbec likewise; Oriane, Duchesse de Guermantes, as the subject of 
masturbatory fantasy, of speculation upon her pedigree, and then as the 
socially assuming self. In Frazer the sun is experienced first as a force to be 
used, then worshipped (named?) as Adonis/Attis/Osiris, then explained 
away as a fiery ball going cold. Similarly corn, similarly rain. 
Frazer for one invites us into a labyrinth at the centre of which lies a 
reputed object: the truth about the cult of Diana Nemorensis which it is his 
express purpose to explore; once trapped within that labyrinth, however, a 
sense of direction is soon lost amid the twists and side-turnings. As the work 
in its various versions progresses, one is led towards a central enclosure from 
the vantage point of which, however, it becomes apparent that the maze 
itself has been the object of the quest: the minotaur, in fact, is the labyrinth.12 
In the culminating phases of the last version, the great Third Edition of 
I906-I5, he finally comes clean: the Priest of the shrine at Nemi, who has 
provided the pretext for this entire excursus is, and has never been more 
than, a puppet dangling on the strings of epistemological uncertainty. 
At the very end of The Golden Bough Frazer plays a not untypical erudite 
trick. He is speaking of the relentless search for human knowledge, a search 
which must never end since certainty, like perfection, can never be found. 
'The advance of knowledge is an infinite progression towards a goal that 
forever recedes', he says, and then quotes Dante: 
Fatti non foste a viver come bruti 
Ma per seguir virtute e conoscenza.13 
The speaker is Ulysses in the picciol oration in which he beckons his fellow 
mariners beyond the Pillars of Hercules in search of a new world. In fact 
Frazer knows, and depends upon his readers knowing, that the voyage thus 
incited ended in disaster. It is as if he is reminding us that no journey has an 
ending, and that all destinations are in effect false turnings. 
10 Most memorably expounded in Golden Bough, I, 220-43. 11 The letter is collected in La correspondance de Marcel Proust, ed. by Philip Kolb (Paris: Plon, 1970-), XII, 
I80. A further exposition of the parallelism between Proust's and Frazer's historiographical schemes will 
be found in Robert Fraser, Proust and the Victorians (Basingstoke: Macmillan, I994), pp. 255-56. 
12 For a fuller account of Frazer's misgivings, see Robert Fraser, The Making of the Golden Bough: The 
Origins and Growth of an Argument (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1990), pp. 203- 2. 
13 xi, 306. The reference is to the Divina Commedia, Inferno, xxvI, I I9-20: 'You were not made to live like 
beasts but to pursue virtue and understanding'. 
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Thus ultimately all reading, like all writing, is a form of desire. And just as 
it is meaningless, because too meaningful, to talk of desire frustrated, since it 
is in delay and in frustration that all desire consists, so it is meaningless, 
because too just, to speak of a thwarted reading of the text, for the very 
reason that thwarting is of the essence of the twin acts we know as writing 
and reading. We are all thwarted lovers: 'love satisfied', writes the poet, 'is 
love dead'. We are all thwarted readers, and insofar as we are so, become 
while reading the thwarted authors whom we read. Thus it is that the 
completion of all artistic manifestations must, and can only, consist in delay. 
